Suez: The Seven Day War (1964) By A. J. Barker
 
British Colonel's first-hand analysis of the military operations and make-shift strategy employed in the Anglo-French and Israeli expedition against Egypt in 1956.
 
The Anglo-French expedition against Egypt in 1956 is perhaps the most dramatic and controversial chapter in our recent history. Because it was called off before the Suez Canal had been occupied and 'de-nationalized', the outcome has sometimes been compared with the Russian defeat by the Japanese at the turn of the century. The prestige which President Nasser gained when he survived the Israeli and Anglo-French assaults has obscured the fact that the Egyptians were soundly beaten in the field and that only U.S. and Soviet intervention saved them from military disaster.
 
----------------------------------------------For Israel the operation was an outstanding military success; even for Britain and France it may be said to have been successful up to the point to which it was carried. But the expedition highlighted some serious shortcomings in the British military machine, and these have led to considerable reorganization as well as a new look in our strategic planning. Problems associated with our Mediterranean base facilities, the need for an 'ever-ready' strategic reserve, the significance of airborne forces and commandos transported in helicopters, as well as with the continuing importance of the Royal Navy whose carriers worked as mobile bases, were all too painfully apparent when the military lessons were summed up afterwards
 
This account is the first comprehensive study that has been made of the whole operation and it should help to dispel much of the mystery which still surrounds the Suez episode. A. J. Barker brings to it the same lucidity, expert knowledge and ability to marshal and deploy the most complicated facts which were so much admired in The March on Delhi, his study of the Imphal campaign.
 
Hard Cover with Dust Jacket
223 pages
In Good Condition